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This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of
targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among targets. The
defender’s objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the attacker’s objective
is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. In this context, our results highlight
the importance of modeling asymmetric attack and defense as a conﬂict between “fully”
strategic actors with endogenous entry and force expenditure decisions as well as allowing
for general correlation structures for force expenditures within and across the networks of
targets.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C7, D74
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In the literature on the optimal defense against intentional attack there has been growing
interest in not only the attack and defense of isolated targets1 but also networks of targets2
and even complex supra-networks of targets.3 This move towards increasing network com-
plexity emphasizes the role that strategic complementarities among targets play in creating
structural asymmetries between attack and defense. For example in complex infrastructure
supra-networks — such as communication systems, electrical power grids, water and sewage
systems, oil pipeline systems, transportation systems, and cyber security systems — there
often exist particular targets or combinations of targets which if destroyed would be suﬃcient
to either: (a) disable the entire supra-network or (b) create a terrorist “spectacular.”
In order to highlight the importance of modeling the attack and defense of complex
supra-networks as a conﬂict between “fully” strategic actors with endogenous entry and
force expenditure decisions, we examine a contest-theoretic model that allows for the use
of general correlation structures for force expenditures within and across the networks of
targets. The supra-network of targets is made up of an arbitrary combination of two simple
types of networks which capture the two extreme endpoints of an exposure-redundency
spectrum of network types. The maximal exposure network, which we label a weakest-link
network, is successfully defended if and only if the defender successfully defends all targets
within the network.4 The maximal redundancy network, which we label a best-shot network,
is successfully defended if the defender successfully defends at least one target within the
network. At each target the conﬂict is modeled as a deterministic contest in which the
player who allocates the higher level of force wins the target with probability one. Given
1See for example Bier et al. (2007), Powell (2007a, b), and Rosendorﬀ and Sandler (2004).
2See for example Bier and Abhichandani (2003), Bier et al. (2005), and Clark and Konrad (2007).
3See for example Azaiez and Bier (2007), Hausken (2008, 2009), and Levitin and Ben-Haim (2008).
4See Hirshleifer (1983) who coins the terms best-shot and weakest-link in the context of voluntary provision
of public goods.
1that the loss of a single network may be suﬃcient to either disable the entire supra-network
or create a terrorist “spectacular,” we focus on the case in which the attacker’s objective is
to successfully attack a single network and the defender’s objective is to successfully defend
all of the networks.
A distinctive feature of this environment is that a mixed strategy is a joint distribution
function in which the randomization in the force allocation to each target is represented as a
separate dimension. A pair of equilibrium joint distribution functions speciﬁes not only each
player’s randomization in force expenditures to each target but also the correlation structure
of the force expenditures within and across the networks of targets. For all parameter
conﬁgurations, we completely characterize the unique set of Nash equilibrium univariate
marginal distributions for each player as well as the unique equilibrium payoﬀ for each
player. Furthermore, in any equilibrium we ﬁnd that the attacker launches an attack on at
most one network of targets, and there exist parameter conﬁgurations for which the attacker
optimally launches no attack with positive probability. Although at most one network is
attacked, the attacker randomizes over which network is attacked, and each of the networks
is attacked with positive probability. In the event that a weakest-link network is attacked, the
attacker optimally launches an attack on only a single target. When a best-shot network is
attacked, the attacker optimally attacks every target in that network with a strictly positive
force level.
As emphasized in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, “terrorists are strategic
actors.” However, much of the existing literature [e.g. Azaiez and Bier (2007), Bier and
Abhichandani (2003), Bier et al. (2005), Bier et al. (2007), Levitin and Ben-Haim (2008),
Powell (2007a, b), and Rosendorﬀ and Sandler (2004).] assumes that terrorists (henceforth
attackers) are not ‘fully’ strategic in the sense that the number of attacks (which is usually set
to one) is exogenously speciﬁed. By endogenizing the attacker’s entry and force expenditure
decisions, we examine not only the conditions under which the assumption of one attack
2is likely to hold, but also related issues such as how the defender’s actions can decrease
the number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the few previous models which allow for the
attacker to endogenously choose the number of targets to attack [e.g. Clark and Konrad
(2007) and Hausken (2008)]5 obtain the result that even when the attacker’s objective is to
disable a single network — and the attacker derives no additional beneﬁt from successfully
disabling more than one network — the attacker optimally chooses to attack every target
in every network with certainty. By demonstrating that in all equilibria of our model the
attacker optimally engages in a form of stochastic guerilla warfare in which at most one
network of targets is attacked, but with positive probability each network is chosen as the
one to be attacked, our results also provide a sharp contrast with existing models of “fully”
strategic attackers.
Section 2 presents the model of attack and defense with networks of targets. Section 3
characterizes a Nash equilibrium and explores properties of the equilibrium distributions of
force. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Players
The model is formally described as follows. Two players, an attacker, A, and a defender, D,
simultaneously allocate their forces across a ﬁnite number, n ≥ 2, of heterogeneous targets.
The players’ payoﬀs depend on the composition of each of the networks of targets in the
supra-network. We examine a supra-network consisting of any arbitrary combination of two
types of simple networks.
5Utilizing probabilistic contest success functions [Clark and Konrad (2007) utilize the Tullock contest
success function, Hausken (2008) utilizes both the Tullock and diﬀerence-form contest success functions],
Clark and Konrad (2007) and Hausken (2008) examine a single weakest-link network and a supra-network
consisting of any arbitrary combination of weakest-link and best-shot networks [as in this paper, a successful
attack on any one network is suﬃcient to disable the entire supra-network], respectively.
3The targets are partitioned into a ﬁnite number k ≥ 1 of disjoint networks, where network
j ∈ {1,...,k} consists of a ﬁnite number nj ≥ 1 of targets with
 k
j=1nj = n. Let Nj denote
the set of targets in network j. Let W denote the set of weakest-link networks and B denote
the set of best-shot networks.
In a best-shot network the network is successfully defended if the defender allocates at
least as high a level of force to at least one target within the network. Conversely, an
attack on a best-shot network is successful if the attacker allocates a higher level of force to
each target in the network. Let xi
A (xi
D) denote the level of force allocated by the attacker












Observe that for each target, the player that allocates the higher level of force wins that
target, but in order to win the network the attacker must win all of the targets. In a best-
shot network, a tie arises when player A allocates a level of force to each target in the network
that is at least as great as player D’s allocation, and there exists at least one target in the
network to which the players allocate the same level of force. In this case, the defender wins
the network.
In the second type of network, which we label a weakest-link network, the network is
successfully defended if the defender allocates at least as high a level of force to all targets
within the network. Conversely, an attack on a weakest-link network is successful if the












4Again, in the case of a tie, the defender is assumed to win the network.
The players are risk neutral and have asymmetric objectives. The attacker’s objective is
to successfully attack at least one network, and the attacker’s payoﬀ for the successful attack
of at least one network is vA > 0. The attacker’s payoﬀ function is given by




















The defender’s objective is to preserve the entire supra-network, and the defender’s payoﬀ
for successfully defending the supra-network is vD > 0. The defender’s payoﬀ function is
given by






















The force allocated to each target must be nonnegative.
It is important to note that our formulation utilizes an auction contest success function.6
It is well known that, because behavior is invariant with respect to positive aﬃne trans-
formations of utility, all-pay auctions in which players have diﬀerent constant unit costs of
resources may be transformed into behaviorally equivalent all-pay auctions with identical
unit costs of resources, but suitably modiﬁed valuations. This result extends directly to the
environment examined here, and thus, our focus on asymmetric valuations also covers the
case in which the players have diﬀerent constant unit costs of resources.
Also observe that in the formulation described above the supra-network is a weakest-link
supra-network. That is if the defender loses a single network then the entire supra-network is
inoperable. By interchanging the identities of player A and player D, our results on weakest-
link supra-networks apply directly to the case of best-shot supra-networks (where a best-shot
supra-network is a supra-network which is successfully defended if the defender successfully
defends at least one network).
6See Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996).
5Figure 1 provides a representative supra-network consisting of 5 networks (A, B, C, D,
and E). Networks A, C, and E are weakest-link (series) networks with two targets each.
Networks B and D are best-shot (parallel) networks with ﬁve targets each. In order to
preserve the entire supra-network player D’s objective is to preserve a path across the entire
network. If a single target in networks A, C, or E is destroyed then the supra-network is
inoperable. Conversely, in networks B and D all of the targets must be destroyed in order
to render the supra-network inoperable.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Strategies
It is clear that there is no pure strategy equilibrium for this class of games. A mixed
strategy, which we term a distribution of force, for player i is an n-variate distribution
function Pi : Rn
+ → [0,1]. The n-tuple of player i’s allocation of force across the n targets is
a random n-tuple drawn from the n-variate distribution function Pi.
Model of Attack and Defense with Networks of Targets






is the one-shot game in which players compete by simultaneously announcing distributions
of force, each target is won by the player that provides the higher allocation of force for that
target, ties are resolved as described above, and players’ payoﬀs, πA and πD, are speciﬁed
above.
63 Optimal Distributions of Force
It is useful to introduce a simple summary statistic that captures both the asymmetry in the
players’ valuations and the structural asymmetries arising in the supra-network.






nj]) denote the normalized relative strength
of the defender.
Several properties of this summary statistic should be noted. First, the normalized
relative strength of the defender is increasing in the relative valuation of the defender to







nj). In particular, the defender’s exposure is increasing in the number
of weakest-link targets (
 






For all parameter ranges, Theorem 1 establishes the uniqueness of: (i) the players’ equilib-
rium expected payoﬀs and (ii) the players’ sets of univariate marginal distributions. Theorem
1 also provides a pair of equilibrium distributions of force for all parameters ranges. Case (1)
of Theorem 1 examines the parameter conﬁgurations for which the defender has a normal-
ized relative strength advantage, i.e. α ≥ 1. Case (2) of Theorem 1 addresses the parameter
conﬁgurations for which the defender has a normalized relative strength disadvantage, i.e.
α < 1. It is important to note that the stated equilibrium distributions of force (n-variate
distributions) are not unique. However, in Propositions 1-3 we characterize properties of
optimal attack and defense that hold in all equilibria.
Theorem 1. For any feasible parameter ﬁguration of the game ADN{{Nj}j∈B,{Nj}j∈W,
vA,vD} there exists a unique set of Nash equilibrium univariate marginal distributions and a
unique equilibrium payoﬀ for each player. One such equilibrium is for each player to allocate
his forces according to the following n-variate distribution functions:









































The expected payoﬀ for player A is 0, and the expected payoﬀ for player D is vD(1− 1
α).


































The expected payoﬀ for player D is 0, and the expected payoﬀ for player A is vA(1−α).
Proof. The proof of the uniqueness of the players’ equilibrium expected payoﬀs and sets of
univariate marginal distributions is given in the Appendix. We now establish that the pair
of n-variate distribution functions given in case (1) constitute an equilibrium for α ≥ 1. The
proof of case (2) is analogous. The Appendix (see Lemma 5) establishes that in any n-tuple
drawn from any equilibrium n-variate distribution PA player A allocates a strictly positive
level of force to at most one network of targets. If the network which receives the strictly
positive level of force is a weakest-link network, then exactly one target in that network
receives a strictly positive level of force. Although not a necessary condition for equilibrium,
8the PA described in Theorem 1 also displays the property that when the network which
receives the strictly positive level of force is a best-shot network the force allocated to each
target in that network is an almost surely increasing function of the force allocated to any of
the other targets in that network. The Appendix (see Lemma 5) also establishes that in any
n-tuple drawn from any equilibrium n-variate distribution PD player D allocates a strictly
positive level of force to at most one target in each best-shot network of targets.
We will now show that for each player each point in the support of their equilibrium
n-variate distribution function, PA or PD, given in case (1) of Theorem 1 results in the same
expected payoﬀ, and then show that there are no proﬁtable deviations from this support.
We begin with the case in which player A attacks a single target in a single weakest-
link network. The probability that player A wins target i in network j ∈ W is given by





we denote as P i
D(xi
A). Given that player D is using the equilibrium strategy PD described
above, the payoﬀ to player A for any allocation of force xA ∈ Rn
+ which allocates a strictly
positive level of force to a single target i in a weakest-link network j ∈ W is

















Thus the expected payoﬀ to player A from allocating a strictly positive level of force to only
one target in any weakest-link network is 0 regardless of which target is attacked.
Next, we examine the case in which player A attacks a single best-shot network. The








A}i∈Nj). Given that player D is using the equilibrium strategy PD described above,
9the payoﬀ to player A for any allocation of force xA ∈ Rn
+ which allocates a strictly positive
level of force only to the targets in a best-shot network j ∈ B, and allocates zero forces to
every other network is



























Thus, the expected payoﬀ to player A from allocating a strictly positive level of force to only
one best-shot network is 0 regardless of which best-shot network is attacked.
For player A, possible deviations from the support include allocating a strictly positive
level of force to: (a) two or more targets in the same weakest-link network, (b) two or more
targets in diﬀerent weakest-link networks, (c) two or more best-shot networks, and (d) any
combination of both weakest-link and best-shot networks.
Beginning with (a), the probability that player A wins both targets i and i′ in network j ∈









A). The payoﬀ to player A for any allocation of force xA ∈ Rn
+
which allocates a strictly positive level of force to two targets i, i′ in a weakest-link network
j ∈ W is























































10The case of player A allocating a strictly positive level of force to more than two targets
in a weakest-link network follows directly. Clearly, in any optimal strategy player A never
allocates a strictly positive level of force to more than one target within a weakest-link
network.
The proof for type (b) deviations follows along similar lines. Thus, in any optimal strategy
player A never allocates a strictly positive level of force to more than one target within a
weakest-link network of targets or in diﬀerent weakest-link networks.
For type (c) deviations, the probability that player A wins all of the targets in both best-












. The payoﬀ to player A for any allocation of force xA ∈ Rn
+ which












































The case of player A allocating a strictly positive level of force to more than two best-shot
networks follows directly. Clearly, in any optimal strategy player A never allocates a strictly
positive level of force to more than one best-shot network.
The case of type (d), follows along similar lines. Thus, the expected payoﬀ from each
point in the support of the n-variate distribution PA results in the same expected payoﬀ, 0,
and there exist no allocations of force which have a higher expected payoﬀ.
The case for player D follows along similar lines.
11Although the equilibrium distributions of force stated in Theorem 1 are not unique,7 it is
useful to provide some intuition regarding the existence of this particular equilibrium before
moving on to the characterization of properties of optimal attack and defense that hold in all
equilibria (Propositions 1-3). The supports of the equilibrium distributions of force stated
in Theorem 1 are given in Figure 2 for two diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations. Panels (i)
and (ii) of Figure 2 provide the supports for the attacker and defender, respectively, in the
case that there is one weakest-link network with two targets (i = 1,2). Panels (iii) and (iv)
of Figure 2 provide the supports for the attacker and defender, respectively, in the case that
there is one best-shot network with two targets (i = 1,2) and one weakest-link network with
one target (i = 3).
[Insert Figure 2]
Across all of the Panels (i)-(iv), if α = 1 then each player randomizes continuously over
their respective shaded line segments. In the event that the defender has a normalized
relative strength advantage (α > 1), the defender’s strategy stays the same, but the attacker
now places a mass point of size 1−(1/α) at the origin and randomizes continuously over the
respective line segments with the remaining probability. Conversely, if the defender has a
normalized relative strength disadvantage (α < 1) then it is the defender who places a mass
point (of size 1 − α) at the origin.
Beginning with Panels (i) and (ii), recall that if the attacker successfully attacks a single
target in a weakest-link network the entire network is disabled. As shown in Panel (i) the
7For example, in the case (1) parameter range of Theorem 1 another equilibrium strategy for player D is
to use the distribution of force
















12attacker launches an attack on at most one target. To successfully defend a weakest-link
network, the defender must win every target within the network. As shown in Panel (ii) the
defender’s allocation of force to target i is an almost surely strictly increasing function of
the force allocated to target −i. Note that if the attacker launches an attack on at most
one target, then the probability that any single attack is successful depends only on the
univariate marginal distributions of the defender’s (n-variate joint) distribution of force. In
addition, the defender’s expected force expenditure depends only on his set of univariate
marginal distributions, and, for a given set of univariate marginal distributions, is invariant
to the correlation structure.8 Finally, note that given the defender’s choice of correlation
structure [Panel (ii)], the attacker’s probability of at least one successful attack depends only
on the maximum of his force allocations across the two targets. That is, given the defender’s
distribution of force, if the set of points such that xi
A > x
−i
A > 0 for some i ∈ {1,2} has





A = 0 for all such points. In such a deviation, the probability of at least one successful
attack is unaﬀected, but the attacker’s expected force expenditure decreases. Thus, at each
point in the support of an optimal distribution of force the attacker launches at most one
attack.
Panels (iii) and (iv) examine a simple supra-network with one best-shot network and one
weakest-link network . In Panel (iii), note that the attacker launches an attack on at most
one network. In the event that the best-shot network is attacked, the attacker’s allocation
of force to target i in the best-shot network is an almost surely strictly increasing function
of the force allocated to target −i in the network. In Panel (iv), note that the defender
allocates a strictly positive level of force to at most one of the targets i ∈ {1,2} in the
best-shot network, and that the level of force allocated to the sole target in the weakest-link
8More formally, for a given set of univariate marginal distribution functions, the expected force expendi-
ture is invariant to the mapping into a joint distribution function, i.e. the n-copula. For further details see
Nelsen (1999).
13network is an almost surely increasing function of the level of force allocated to the best-shot
network. Given these correlation structures, the intuition for why the attacker launches an
attack on at most one network in the supra-network follows along the lines given above for
the weakest-link network in which at most one target was attacked.
We now characterize the qualitative features arising in all equilibrium distributions of
force. Proposition 1 examines the number of networks that are simultaneously attacked as
well as the number of targets within each network that are simultaneously attacked and
defended. Propositions 2 and 3 examine the likelihood that the attacker optimally chooses
to launch an attack on any given network, and the likelihood that the attacker launches no
attack or the defender leaves the supra-network undefended.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium {PA,PD}:
1. Player A allocates a strictly positive level of force to at most one network.
2. If player A allocates a strictly positive level of force to a weakest-link network, then one
target in that network receives a strictly positive level of force
3. In each best-shot network player D allocates a strictly positive level of force to at most
one target in the network.
The formal proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix (see Lemma 5). The intuition
for Proposition 1 follows from the fact that the likelihood that player D successfully defends
all of the networks (and therefore player D’s expected payoﬀ) is weakly decreasing in the
number of networks that player A chooses to simultaneously attack. However, player D has
the ability to vary the correlation structure of his force allocations while leaving invariant: (i)
his network speciﬁc multivariate marginal distributions of force, (ii) his univariate marginal
distributions of force, and (iii) his expected expenditure. Furthermore, there exist correlation
structures for which the likelihood that player D successfully defends all of the networks
14depends only on player A’s force allocation to the one network which receives the highest
level of force from player A. Given that player D is using such a correlation structure, player
A optimally attacks at most one network at a time.
Proposition 2. If α ≥ 1, then in any equilibrium {PA,PD}:
1. The probability that any weakest-link network j is attacked (i.e., the probability that
the attacker allocates a strictly positive level of force to weakest-link network j) is
(njvA/vD), which is increasing in the number of targets in network j and the attacker’s
valuation of success and decreasing in the defender’s valuation of successfully defending
the entire supra-network.
2. The probability that any best-shot network j is attacked is (vA)/(njvD), which is in-
creasing in the attacker’s valuation of success and is decreasing in both the defender’s
valuation and the number of targets in network j.
3. The attacker optimally attacks no network in the supra-network with probability 1 −
(1/α).
In the Appendix, we provide the univariate marginal distributions that arise in any
equilibrium joint distribution of the attacker. Moreover, we show that if α > 1, then in any
equilibrium the attacker paces a mass point at the origin. Proposition 2 follows directly. The
probability that a network j is attacked is equal to one minus the attacker’s mass point at
zero in the nj-variate marginal distribution for network j, P
Nj
A ({xi}i∈Nj). The likelihood that
the attacker optimally chooses to launch no attack is increasing in the defender’s valuation
of success and decreasing in the attacker’s valuation of success.
For α ≥ 1, the attacker’s valuation is low enough relative to the defender’s valuation that
the optimal strategy includes not launching an attack with positive probability. For α < 1,
the attacker optimally launches an attack with certainty. In this case the probability that any
15given network of targets is attacked depends only on the number of targets in the network
and the type of network. The proof of Proposition 3 also follows from the characterization
of the properties of equilibrium joint distribution given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. If α < 1, then in any equilibrium {PA,PD}:
1. The probability that any weakest-link network j is attacked (i.e., the probability that







nj′]), which is increasing in the number of targets in network
j.







which is decreasing in the number of targets in network j.
3. The defender optimally leaves the entire supra-network undefended with probability
1 − α.
If α ≥ 1, the defender optimally chooses, with certainty, to allocate a strictly positive
level of defensive force. However, if α < 1, the defender optimally chooses to leave the entire
supra-network undefended with positive probability. Furthermore, the likelihood that the
defender chooses to leave the entire supra-network undefended is increasing in the attacker’s
valuation of success and decreasing in the defender’s valuation of successfully defending the
entire supra-network.
To summarize, the following conditions hold in all equilibria. If α > 1 the attacker
optimally chooses not to launch an attack with positive probability. Regardless of the value
of α, the attacker optimally launches an attack on at most one network. In the event that
a weakest-link network is attacked, only one target within the network is attacked. The
likelihood that any individual network is attacked depends on the number of targets within
the network. In each weakest-link network the likelihood of attack is increasing in the number
16of targets. In each best-shot network the likelihood of attack is decreasing in the number of
targets. If α < 1, the defender optimally leaves the entire supra-network undefended with
positive probability. Lastly, regardless of the value of α, when the defender chooses to defend
the supra-network, within each best-shot network, the defender randomly chooses at most
one target to defend.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines a game theoretic model of attack and defense of a supra-network,
made up of a combination of weakest-link and best-shot networks of targets. The model
features asymmetric objectives: the defender wishes to successfully defend all networks and
the attackers objective is to successfully attack at least one network. Although the model
allows for general correlation structures for force expenditures within and across the networks
of targets, for any such conﬁguration of networks, we derive the unique equilibrium expected
payoﬀs of the attacker and defender and demonstrate that there exists a unique equilibrium
univariate marginal distribution of forces to each target. An equilibrium pair of strategies
for the attacker and defender, each of which is a joint distribution governing the allocation
of forces to all targets, is also constructed, although these are generally non-unique.
Our approach leads to a wealth of interesting extensions and applications. Because the
game examined here is a set of complete information all-pay auctions linked by payoﬀ com-
plementarities, almost any extension of the standard one-dimensional strategic allocation
problem represented by the standard all-pay auction with complete information has a corre-
sponding extension in this game. Examples include, incomplete information, about values or
unit costs of forces, aﬃne handicapping of players within target contests, and nonlinear costs
of forces.9 In addition, as in other models of strategic multidimensional resource allocation,
9Examples of these extensions for the one-dimensional strategic allocation problem include Amann and
Leininger (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1997), Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006), Gale and Stegeman (1994),
17such as Colonel Blotto games, interesting extensions arise by introducing more heterogeneity
across targets, such as allowing for diﬀerential target values for attacker and defender within
the weakest-link and best-shot structure, or other linkages across targets, such as budget
constraints or “infrastructure technologies” that allow lumpy force expenditure across sets
of multiple targets or networks. Furthermore, because our model succeeds in pinning down
unique equilibrium payoﬀs for arbitrary network conﬁgurations and player valuations, it
readily serves as a component model for multistage models of network investment, where
uniqueness of subgame equilibrium payoﬀs avoids a multiplicity of equilibria supported by
ﬁnite horizon trigger strategies. Hence, theories of strategic network investment and systems
redundancies may be simply addressed in the framework, in which each best shot network j
employed may be viewed as a network with nj − 1 redundant components.
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20Appendix
This appendix characterizes the supports of the equilibrium joint distributions, the unique
equilibrium payoﬀs, and the unique sets of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions.
Before proceeding, observe the following notational conventions which will be used through-
out the appendix. For points in Rn, we will use the vector notation x = (x1,x2,...,xn). For
ak ≤ bk for all k = 1,2,...,n, let [a,b] denote the n-box B = [a1,b1]×[a2,b2]×...×[an,bn],
the Cartesian product of n closed intervals. The vertices of the n-box B are the points




i denote the upper and lower
bounds, respectively, for player i’s distribution of force for target j.
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(1)
denote the probability that with a force allocation of xA the attacker wins at least one































































where EPA denotes the expectation with respect to the joint distribution of force PA and
EP i
A denotes the expectation with respect to the univariate marginal distribution for target
i, henceforth P i
A, of the joint distribution of force PA.























denote the probability that with a force allocation of xD the defender wins all of the networks





























































where EPD and EP i
D denote the expectation with respect to the joint distribution of force
PD and the expectation with respect to the univariate marginal distribution for target i, P i
D,
respectively.
We begin by showing that for each target i within weakest-link (best-shot) network j,





lower bound of 0 (0).
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium: (i) for each j ∈ W, ¯ si
A = ¯ si
D = ¯ s
j
W > 0 and si
A = si
D = 0 for
all i ∈ Nj, and (ii) for each j ∈ B, ¯ si
A = ¯ si
D = ¯ s
j
B > 0 and si
A = si
D = 0 for all i ∈ Nj.
Proof. We begin with the proof that si
A = si
D = 0 for all i. By way of contradiction, suppose
si
A  = si
D. Let ˆ s
i ≡ max{si
A,si








−l > 0, when player −l allocates si
−l to target i player −l loses target i with certainty
and can strictly increase his payoﬀ by setting si
−l = 0. It follows directly, that player −l does
22not randomize over the open interval (0, ˆ s
i), and thus player −l must have a mass point at
0.
In the case that si
−l = 0 (where player −l does not randomize over the open interval
(0, ˆ s
i) and has a mass point at 0), we know that (i) both players cannot have a mass point
at si
l, (ii) player −l cannot place mass at si
l, and (iii) player l can strictly increase his payoﬀ
by lowering si
l to a neighborhood above 0. Thus, we conclude that si
A = si
D = 0 for all i.
Lastly, for the proof that for each j ∈ W, ¯ si
A = ¯ si
D = ¯ s
j
W > 0 for all i ∈ Nj, note that if
there exists a target i such that ¯ si
A = ¯ si
D = 0, then player A can strictly increase his payoﬀ
by allocating an arbitrarily small, but strictly positive, level of force to weakest-link target i.
Similarly, for any pair i′,i′′ ∈ Nj it follows that if ¯ si′
A = ¯ si′
D < ¯ si′′
A = ¯ si′′
D then player A would
do better by moving mass from ¯ si′′
A to ¯ si′
A. The proof that for each j ∈ B, ¯ si
A = ¯ si
D = ¯ s
j
B > 0
for all i ∈ Nj follows from a similar argument.




i=1, for each target i neither player’s univariate marginal distribution places positive
mass on any point except possibly at zero.
Proof. If for target i, xi
l > 0 is such a point for player l, then player −l would either beneﬁt
from moving mass from an ǫ-neighborhood below xi
l to zero or to a δ-neighborhood above
xi
l.
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium, each player’s expected payoﬀ (equations (2) and (5) for the
attacker and defender respectively) is constant over the support of his joint distribution except
possibly at points of discontinuity of his expected payoﬀ function.
Proof. Except for possibly at points of discontinuity of his expected payoﬀ function, each
player l must make his equilibrium expected payoﬀ at each point in the support of his
equilibrium strategy, Pl. Otherwise, player l would beneﬁt by moving mass to the n-tuple(s)
in his support with the highest expected payoﬀ.




i=1, for each target i each player l’s univariate marginal distribution P i
l randomizes
continuously over the interval (0, ¯ si].
Proof. Lemma 2 rules out mass points of P i
l in the interval (0, ¯ si]. To rule out gaps, by way of
contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which for some target i, player l’s
univariate marginal distribution for target i, P i
l , is constant over the interval [α,β) ⊂ (0, ¯ si]
and strictly increasing above β in its support. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the
case that P i
−l is also constant over the interval [α,β). Otherwise, player −l could increase
his payoﬀ.
If P i
−l(α) = P i
−l(β), then for suﬃciently small ǫ > 0 spending β + ǫ in target i cannot
be optimal for player l. Indeed, by discretely reducing his expenditure from β + ǫ to α + ǫ
player l’s payoﬀ would strictly increase. Consequently, if P i
l is constant over [α,β) it must
also be constant over [α, ¯ si], a contradiction to the deﬁnition of ¯ si.
Lemma 5. In any equilibrium {PA,PD}:
(a) If xA is an n-tuple contained in the support of PA, then xA allocates a strictly positive
level of force to at most one network.
(b) If the n-tuple xA (contained in the support of PA) allocates a strictly positive level of
force to a weakest-link network, then one target in that weakest-link network receives a
strictly positive level of force.
(c) If xD is an n-tuple contained in the support of PD, then within each best-shot network
xD allocates a strictly positive level of force to at most one target in the network.
Proof. We begin with the proof of part (a). By way of contradiction suppose that there exists
an equilibrium {PA,PD} such that at one or more points in the support of PA at least two
networks simultaneously receive strictly positive levels of force (henceforth, simultaneously
24attacked). Let x
j
A denote the restriction of the vector xA to the set of targets contained in
network j (i.e., {xi
A}i∈Nj). Denote the set of points in the support of PA that simultaneously
attack at least two networks as
ΩA ≡ {xA ∈ Supp{PA}
   ∃ at least two j ∈ B ∪ W s.t. x
j
A  = 0}.
For each point xA ∈ ΩA let P(j ∈ B ∪ W|x
j
A  = 0) denote the power set of the indices of
networks that player A simultaneously attacks at the point xA. Let ψ denote an arbitrary
element of this power set, let |ψ| denote the cardinality of the set ψ, and let x
ψ
A denote
the restriction of the vector xA to the set of targets contained in the networks in ψ (i.e.,
{xi
A}i∈∪j∈ψNj).
Before stating the probability that at an arbitrary point xA ∈ ΩA player A wins at least
one network, consider the probability that player A wins at least one network in the special



















































where the third term in the second line of (7) corrects for the ﬁrst two terms’ multiple
countings of player A winning at least one network. Similarly, if at xA ∈ ΩA player A

















































































where, again, the third and fourth lines of (8) correct for the second line’s multiple countings
of player A winning at least one network. A straightforward proof by induction shows that































ιj = 1 ∀ j ∈ ψ






We begin by examining the case in which for all xA ∈ ΩA only best-shot networks are
simultaneously attacked and refer to this as case (i). We then move on to case (ii) in
which for all xA ∈ ΩA only weakest-link networks are simultaneously attacked. Case (iii)
includes all remaining conﬁgurations of simultaneous attacks (i.e., there exists at least one
point xA ∈ ΩA such that player A simultaneously attacks an arbitrary combination of both
weakest-link and best-shot networks and/or there exist points in ΩA at which only best-shot
networks are simultaneously attacked and points at which only weakest-link networks are
simultaneously attacked).
In case (i), simultaneous attacks occur on only best-shot networks, and the probability












D is the nj-variate marginal distribution for network j. Similarly, the probability
that player A wins every target in each best-shot network j ∈ ψ is
Pr
 
ιj = 1 ∀ j ∈ ψ










D is the (
 
j∈ψ nj)-variate marginal distribution over all of the networks j ∈ ψ. Note




A)} then for each j ∈ B∪W the




A) is preserved, for each i ∈ ∪j∈B∪WNj the univariate
marginal distribution P i
D(xi
A) is preserved, and for each ψ ∈ P(j ∈ B|x
j












Because the expected cost of the strategy PD — given in the second term in (6) — depends
only on the set of univariate marginal distributions {P i
D}i∈∪j∈B∪WNj, the strategy ˆ PD(xA)
has the same expected cost as PD(xA). However, inserting (10), (11), and (12) into (9) a































That is, if player D uses the strategy ˆ PD(xA), then, in the event that player A simultaneously
attacks two or more best-shot networks, the probability that player A successfully attacks
at least one of the best-shot networks is equal to the probability that player A successfully







27Therefore, if PD = ˆ PD then from (2) player A could increase his payoﬀ by attacking only
network ¯ j. A contradiction to the assumption that {PA,PD} is an equilibrium. Conversely,
if PD  = ˆ PD, then the deviation to the strategy ˆ PD leaves player D’s expected costs invariant
and at each xA ∈ ΩA essentially nulliﬁes player A’s attacks on all but network ¯ j. Thus,
the expected cost-invariant deviation from PD to ˆ PD increases player D’s probability of





is preserved, the deviation from PD to ˆ PD also maintains player D’s probability of successful
defense at each xA / ∈ ΩA. From (4) this is a proﬁtable deviation, and also a contradiction to
the assumption that {PA,PD} is an equilibrium. This completes the proof of part (i) of the
proof of (a).
Before moving on to cases (ii) and (iii) in the proof of part (a), note that the argument
given above can be used to establish part (b) of Lemma 5 (i.e., within each weakest-link
network player A attacks at most one target). In particular, at target i in weakest-link
network j let ιj,i = 1 if xi
A > xi
D and ιj,i = 0 otherwise. The probability that player A wins


























A) = mini∈Nj{P i
D(xi
A)}, player D’s univariate marginals and hence
the expected cost remain the same, the correlation of player D’s allocation of force among
the networks is unaﬀected, and the correlation of player D’s allocation of force among the
targets in weakest-link network j renders all simultaneous attacks among the targets in
weakest-link network j equivalent to an attack on only ¯ i = argmaxi∈Nj{P i
D(xi
A)}. Thus, in
equilibrium the attacker allocates a strictly positive level of force to at most one target in
each weakest-link network. The proof for part (c) of Lemma 5 follows from a symmetric
argument.
28Returning to the proof of case (ii) of part (a) of Lemma 5, from part (b) of Lemma 5,
player A attacks at most one target in any weakest-link network, and the probability that
player A wins weakest-link network j with an allocation of xi′
A > 0 and xi











If player D uses the strategy ˆ PD, then for each ψ ∈ P(j ∈ W|x
j
A  = 0) − ∅ it follows from
(15) that the probability that player A wins every weakest-link network j ∈ ψ is








Inserting (15) and (16) into (9) a straightforward proof by induction shows that for each






























From (17) it is clear that an argument similar to that used to establish case (i) applies. This
completes the proof of case (ii). The proof of case (iii) follows along similar lines.
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium, ¯ s
j
W = ¯ s
j′
W ≡ ¯ sW, ∀ j′,j′′ ∈ W.
Proof. Following from Lemmas 1, 2 and 5, in the support of any equilibrium strategy, when
player A allocates ¯ s
j′
W to a single target in network j′ the force allocated to each of the
remaining targets is 0, player A wins network j′ with certainty, and player A’s expected
payoﬀ is vA − ¯ s
j′
W.
From Lemma 3, player A’s expected payoﬀ is constant across all points in the support of
PA except for points of discontinuity of the expected payoﬀ function. Thus, from Lemma 4
∀ j′,j′′ ∈ W, vA − ¯ s
j′
W = vA − ¯ s
j′′
W, or equivalently ¯ s
j′
W = ¯ s
j′′
W ≡ ¯ sW.
29Lemma 7. In any equilibrium {PA,PD}, there exists a kA ≥ 0 such that for any best-shot
network j and every nj-tuple x
j













Proof. From Lemma 5 part (c) in the support of any optimal strategy player D allocates a
strictly positive level of force to at most one target in network j, and thus the support of
player D’s nj-variate marginal distribution for network j, P
Nj
D , is located on the axes in R
nj
+ .
Because from Lemma 4 each of player D’s univariate marginals randomizes continuously over
the interval (0, ¯ s
j
B], there are no mass points in the support of player D’s nj-variate marginal
distribution for network j, P
Nj
D , except for possibly at the origin in R
nj
+ .
From Lemma 5 part (a) in the support of any equilibrium strategy player A attacks at
most one network. In the event that player A attacks a best-shot network j, Lemmas 3
and 4 show that there exists a kA ≥ 0 such that for each xA in the support of PA in which
x
j


























Moreover, from the deﬁnition of ιB
j it is clear that for each xA in the support of any equi-
librium strategy PA such that x
j
A  = 0, it must be that x
j
A ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B]nj. Otherwise, player A
could increase his payoﬀ by setting x
j
A = 0.
The proof that follows shows that the second inequality in equation (18) holds not only
for each xA in the support of PA such that x
j
A ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B]nj, but for all nj-tuples xj ∈ [0, ¯ s
j
B]nj.
Consider an arbitrary point xA ∈ Supp(PA) in which xi′
A ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B) for i′ ∈ Nj. Because
xA ∈ Supp(PA) and x
j
A  = 0, it must be that x
j
A ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B]nj. Thus, equation (18) holds.
From Lemma 4, there exists an ǫi′
> 0 such that (xi′
A + ǫi′
) ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B]. Furthermore, there
exists a point ˜ xA ∈ Supp(PA) such that ˜ xi′
A = (xi′
A +ǫi′
). Similarly, for each i ∈ Nj such that
i  = i′ deﬁne ǫi as ǫi = ˜ xi
A − xi
A.
Because from Lemma 5 part (a) player A attacks at most one network and in both xA
and ˜ xA player A attacks network j, we know that for each i / ∈ Nj, ˜ xi
A = xi
A = 0, and we
30can restrict our focus to player D’s nj-variate marginal distribution for best-shot network j,
P
Nj




D (xj) is equal to the P
Nj





































Because the support of P
Nj
D is located on the axes in R
nj










measure of the support of P
Nj
D over the interval (xi
A, ˜ xi
A) on the ith axis.10 Note that the
diﬀerence in (19) involves one point in the support of PA, (x1,...,xi−1,xi
A,xi+1,...,xnj), and
one point, (x1,...,xi−1, ˜ xi
A,xi+1,...,xnj) ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B]nj, that may or may not be in the support
of PA. Because the expected payoﬀ from the nj-tuple (x1,...,xi−1, ˜ xi
A,xi+1,...,xnj) must
be less than or equal to the equilibrium expected payoﬀ and from Lemma 4 the ﬁrst equality














Because the support of P
Nj
D is located on the axes in R
nj






















That is, the P
Nj
D -volume of the nj-box [0, ˜ x
j
A] is equal to the P
Nj
D -volume of the nj-box [0,x
j
A]
plus the measure of the support of P
Nj
D over the interval (xi
A, ˜ xi
A) on each of the i ∈ Nj axes,
where the caveat in footnote 10 applies.
Because both xA and ˜ xA are contained in the support of PA and xA, ˜ xA ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B]nj it
10This interval is for the case that xi
A ≤ ˜ xi
A, or equivalently ǫi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ Nj. If xi
A > ˜ xi
A for one or











































Combining equations (21) and (22) it follows that for each i ∈ Nj equation (20) holds with
equality. That is the measure of the support of P
Nj
D over the interval (xi
A, ˜ xi
A) on the ith
axis is equal to ǫi/vA.
Given that the points xA and ˜ xA were arbitrarily chosen from the support of PA and
that there are no mass points in the support of player D’s nj-variate marginal distribution
for network j, P
Nj
D , except for possibly at the origin, it follows directly that the measure of
the support of P
Nj
D over any interval [a,b] ⊂ (0, ¯ s
j
B] on the ith axis is equal to (b − a)/vA.
Furthermore, player D must place a mass point of size kA/vA at the point xj = 0, and from
(18), Lemma 1, and Lemma 2, kA = vA − nj¯ s
j
B ≥ 0. This concludes the proof of Lemma
7.
Lemma 8. In any equilibrium, ¯ sW = nj¯ s
j
B, ∀ j ∈ B.
Proof. From the combination of Lemma 3, Lemma 4, Lemma 5 parts (a) and (b) and Lemma
6, for an attack of xi
A ∈ (0, ¯ sW] on any weakest-link target i player A’s expected payoﬀ is
vA − ¯ sW. Conversely, from Lemma 7 it follows that within any best-shot network j player
A’s expected payoﬀ is constant not only for those points in the support of PA which attack
network j, but for all nj-tuples x
j
A ∈ (0, ¯ s
j
B]nj. If we consider the nj-tuple consisting of ¯ s
j
B
for each of the nj elements, then we see that player A’s expected payoﬀ from any attack on
a best-shot network j is vA − nj¯ s
j
B.
From Lemma 3, player A’s expected payoﬀ is constant across all points in the support
of PA, except possibly at points of discontinuity of the expected payoﬀ function. Thus, ∀
j ∈ B, vA − ¯ sW = vA − nj¯ s
j
B or equivalently ¯ sW = nj¯ s
j
B.





32Proof. If player D allocates: (i) ¯ sW to each target in each weakest-link network, (ii) ¯ s
j
B to
exactly one target in each best-shot network j, and (iii) 0 to each of the remaining targets
in the best-shot networks, then from Lemmas 4, 6, and 8 player D wins all networks with
certainty and has an expected payoﬀ of vD−
 
j∈W nj¯ sW +
 
j∈B(¯ sW/nj). Similarly, if player
A allocates ¯ sW to a single weakest-link target, then from Lemmas 4 and 6, player A wins the
weakest-link network containing that target with certainty, and player A’s expected payoﬀ
is vA − ¯ sW.




j∈B(1/nj)] > 0, then in any equilibrium {PA,PD} player D must
necessarily have a strictly positive expected payoﬀ. As a result, for each xD ∈ Supp{PD},
except for possibly at points of discontinuity of his expected payoﬀ function, player D must
simultaneously win all of the networks with a probability that is bounded away from zero.
This, combined with part (a) of Lemma 5, Lemma 7, and the fact that in equilibrium at
most one player abstains from allocating strictly positive forces to a network with positive
probability, implies that in each best-shot network j player D’s mixed strategy does not
place an atom on the nj-tuple x
j
D = 0. Recalling from the proof of Lemma 7 that in each
best-shot network j player D places an atom of size (vA −nj¯ s
j
B)/vA on the nj-tuple x
j
D = 0,
it follows from Lemma 8 that vA − ¯ sW = 0.
Next, note that if vA−¯ sW > 0, then in any equilibrium {PA,PD} player A must necessarily
have a strictly positive expected payoﬀ, and a similar argument establishes that in each best-
shot network j player D’s mixed strategy does place an atom on the nj-tuple x
j
D = 0. But,
if with strictly positive probability, player D abstains from allocating a strictly positive level





j∈B(1/nj)] ≤ 0. To conclude the proof, since player D would never choose




j∈B(1/nj)] < 0, player A has no incentive to choose










Proof. This proof is for the uniqueness of player D’s set of univariate marginal distributions.
The proof for player A is analogous. For each best-shot network j ∈ B, Lemmas 7 and
8 show that for any x
j












vA , where from Lemma 9








nj . Thus, in each
best-shot network j player D’s unique univariate marginal distributions follow from player
D’s unique nj-variate marginal distribution for network j.
From Lemma 5 parts (a) and (b), player A attacks at most one target in one weakest-
link network. From Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 it follows that for each target i in each weakest-link











A = vA − ¯ sW
for xi
A ∈ (0, ¯ sW]. Thus, player D’s univariate marginal distributions are uniquely determined
in each weakest-link network.
Next, note that because success for player D involves simultaneously defending all net-
works from attack and that for each network at most one player abstains from allocating
a positive level of force to the network, it follows that if with positive probability player D
abstains from allocating strictly positive forces to any network then with positive probability
player D optimally abstains from allocating strictly positive forces to all networks. Other-
wise, player D could increase his expected payoﬀ at such points by allocating zero forces
to all networks. Combining this fact with Lemma 10, the next two lemmas follow directly.







Lemma 11. If α ≥ 1, then in any equilibrium: (i) player A places mass 1 − (1/α) at the
origin, (ii) player A’s expected payoﬀ is 0, (iii) player D does not place positive mass at the
origin, and (iv) player D’s expected payoﬀ is vD − (vD/α).
34Lemma 12. If α < 1, then in any equilibrium: (i) player D places mass 1−α at the origin,
(ii) player D’s expected payoﬀ is 0, (iii) player A does not place positive mass at the origin,














Figure 1: Example Supra-Network with Five Networks (A, B, C, D, and E)















One best-shot network with two targets (i = 1,2) and one weakest-link network with one

























Figure 2: Supports of the equilibrium joint distributions stated in Theorem 1 (˜ vA =
min{αvA,vA}).
37